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Stanley Fish, the Meaning of Academic Freedom and 
Social Responsibility 
Peter Bowal* 
Discussing academic freedom is similar to discussing freedoms of 
other essences – one is challenged to enumerate and master its many themes 
and nuances.  Professor Fish’s Versions of Academic Freedom: From 
Professionalism to Revolution,1 a self-styled “thesis book”, is a literature 
review that offers one of the most robust analyses on the subject to date. 
Such negotiable nuances, in the form of distinctions and definitions, 
present themselves early in Fish’s book.  Some observers, for example, 
would not fundamentally distinguish between “the advancement of 
knowledge”2 and “the search for truth.”3  They would prefer to view them 
as the same thing.  On the other hand, Fish’s definition of improper 
influence in the academy is unimpeachable: distortions “by the interests of 
outside constituencies . . . that have something other than the search for 
truth in mind.”4 
Moving beyond definitions, Fish asserts that “no higher, supervening, 
authority undergirds” the pursuit of knowledge and truth.5  One of those 
insalubrious external influences, the proverbial elephant in the classroom, 
remains corporate funding or, more precisely, the influence and priorities 
purchased by it.  Yet, the horse has bolted the barn on that issue because 
long past is the day where any post-secondary institution in the western 
world functioned without a penny of private money.  Even if an institution 
remained wholly publicly funded, it would be disingenuous to suggest that 
the sponsoring government, political party or ministry was wholly free of 
political will.  That political aspiration is apt to seep into regulation, 
overseer appointments and the funding flows. 
A more questionable premise of pure academic freedom is the political 
philosophy of individual academic faculty members.  The academic self is 
inherently, and often unknowingly, captive to ideology and worldview.  
Academic institutions and the academic enterprise are focused on the 
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creation of human-made solutions to policy and scientific problems.  The 
power and triumph of the human mind to not only find the best way 
forward, using public money where possible, but then to hasten to intervene 
and apply these solutions to life problems bespeaks of a more liberal, 
secular, humanist inclination than might be observed as representative 
outside of the academy. 
Another element of academic freedom under scrutiny is whether 
society can permit, without limitation, high priced and tenured academics to 
freely steer their own research agenda throughout their careers without any 
regard for the needs of the society that support them.  The classical 
economic theory in play is that an unfettered market of ideas and research 
over a large population of academics will produce an optimum balance of 
new, socially-useful knowledge.  However, to illustrate with a fanciful 
example, can all members of a department take a lifelong research interest 
in questions that bear no direct salience whatsoever to the community in 
which they derive all their support?  How long will community needs be 
allayed by the assurance that somewhere in the world solutions are being 
found for its problems? 
Indeed, as Fish demonstrates, the dance of academic freedom occurs 
along the edges and extremes of human endeavor.  The single most engaged 
concern about academic freedom in North America today is one that Fish 
does not analyze at length: the inter-relationship between academic freedom 
and tenured job security.  Academic freedom, like its analogues in the legal 
system of attorney-client privilege and judicial independence, redounds to 
social interests and not to the preservation of the individual academic, or 
lawyer and judge, respectively.  It is too often asserted as a shield to defend 
behaviors unrelated to genuine academic inquiry. 
 
 
